CRCC and Minister of Public Safety Gary Anandasangaree,
Sent by email, facsimile, and Canada Post Registered Mail. Copies sent to the CRCC, Office of the Minister of Public Safety, and House of Commons Office of the Honourable Gary Anandasangaree on August 27, 2026.
I write with serious concern regarding the CRCC’s handling of complaints involving sexual assault, national security and election interference, and specifically the Commission’s obligations concerning referral to the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA), in relation to two CRCC cases: 2023-1031 and 2026-1781.
On the core issue, on February 22, 2025, CSIS opened case Attachment5566 concerning information submitted in this matter, with the CSIS email address Attachment5566@smtp.gc.ca. This was also provided to the CRCC and included on relevant correspondence. Despite repeatedly being provided that reference and being placed on notice of the national-security concerns, the CRCC did not refer the matter to NSIRA, notwithstanding the statutory requirement to refer complaints concerning activity closely related to national security, and then failed to properly communicate the national-security concerns to the RCMP and the Minister of Public Safety.
The Commission had already been placed on notice long before that. Foreign-interference concerns were referenced by the CRCC on May 29, 2023 and again on April 3, 2024. On May 24, 2025, I provided the CSIS case reference and formally requested appropriate reporting consistent with the legislation, while NSIRA was added to the email thread. On October 2, 2025, I again advised the Commission of CSIS reference Attachment5566 and again requested escalation.
The Commission’s own published material states:
“The CRCC does not have jurisdiction to conduct a review of an RCMP activity that is related to national security. These matters are referred to the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA).”
Where subsection 45.53(4.1) of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act applies, the matter is referred to NSIRA. NSIRA then determines whether the complaint is trivial, frivolous, vexatious or made in bad faith.
On March 17, 2026, CRCC intake manager Paul expressly acknowledged the issue:
“The Commission does not report to CSIS. If the Commission feels that this complaint is closely related to national security, which is still being considered, then the Commission will adhere to current legislated reporting requirements.”
Paul personally failed to provide a substantive response to the reports concerning sexual assault, national security, election interference and foreign interference for 261 days, and then blamed the complainant. That delay is particularly important given the CRCC’s later attempts to characterize the length and volume of my correspondence as the problem. The detailed reviews that substantially increased the size of the record were not submitted until March 27, 2026, April 7, 2026 and April 13, 2026 — after approximately 300 days of inaction, during which the underlying allegations remained unresolved and the officers responsible for dealing with them had not even contacted me. The length of those later submissions was therefore a consequence of the prolonged failures and delays being documented, not the cause of them.
The CRCC was advised that CSIS had accepted the material under Attachment5566 and instructed that supporting material continue to be submitted through Attachment5566@smtp.gc.ca, an address included on the relevant correspondence and available for the Commission to verify. CSIS does not publicly disclose whether it is conducting an investigation or the weight it assigns to submitted material. The criminal investigative responsibility concerning national-security offences rests with the RCMP.
CSIS is an intelligence service. Under section 6(1) of the Security Offences Act, RCMP peace officers hold primary responsibility for peace-officer duties in relation to offences arising from threats to the security of Canada as defined in section 2 of the CSIS Act. The fact that CSIS accepted the material under a specific reference should, at minimum, have put the CRCC on notice that the national-security concerns required serious treatment.
Twenty-two days after Paul acknowledged that legislated national-security reporting requirements could apply, the CRCC Review, in relation to the original CRCC case 2023-1031, wrote on April 8, 2026:
“With respect to your second question regarding ‘Scope of Review — Sexual Assault, Election Interference, and National Security’. Please note that these issues and questions are not part of the current review file, as they are being addressed separately under the pending complaint file R2024-005807.”
R2024-005807 was itself a CRCC complaint file. It was subsequently merged into 2026-1781 and delegated to Cpl. Joseph Fraser, who would contact me on June 1, 2026.
By April 8, 2026, the CRCC therefore knew that these matters had been consistently reported, that the RCMP had repeatedly failed to address them, and that emails and audio recordings existed demonstrating that fact. At that stage, the CRCC should have absolutely engaged NSIRA regarding the national-security component.
The first CRCC complaint, 2023-1031, was originally assigned to Cpl. Jeff Stevens and was later assigned to Insp. Cory Bushell and Sgt. Trevor Allen. In audio recordings, Stevens specifically stated that he had logged the issues being reported, including the evidence and concerns I was attempting to have investigated, among them the national-security concerns. The subsequent report prepared under Bushell and Allen also identified investigative work carried out by Joseph Fraser, and Fraser has now confirmed that he personally participated in 2023-1031.
That is important because these were not allegations first appearing years later. Stevens had already logged the issues, and Bushell, Allen, Fraser and the unidentified “Decision Maker” were subsequently involved in reviewing and handling the complaint record in which those concerns had already been raised and documented.
By that point, the complaint was already outside the mandated timeframe for providing a response. Yet the investigation assigned to Bushell and Allen, with Fraser participating in its handling, was opened on June 1, 2025 and completed by June 4, 2025.
That investigation of 2023-1031 was closed without the complainant ever being contacted by the investigators — even though the CRCC itself stated on September 16, 2024 that “the Commission contacted the RCMP’s National Public Complaint Directorate to request that Sgt. Trevor Allen contact you.”
When later questioned about his involvement in 2023-1031, Cpl. Joseph Fraser — now the assigned Public Complaint Investigator for 2026-1781 — repeatedly refused to answer whether the CRCC had provided him with CSIS case Attachment5566, or whether he understood that the complaint included national-security and election-interference concerns. He has still not answered those questions.
Cpl. Joseph Fraser’s involvement in 2023-1031 objectively creates a serious conflict-of-interest concern in relation to 2026-1781. That concern is made even more significant by the fact that Fraser himself assigned “Neglect of Duty” to both Cory Bushell and Trevor Allen for their handling of 2023-1031 — a process in which Fraser had directly participated.
The provisions Fraser assigned to each officer are available here:
https://thewolfandtheneuralnetwork.com/HTMLDocuments/2026-06-01_Provisions_And_email_From_Cpl_Joseph_Fraser.html (https://tinyurl.com/33t39ham)
The CRCC was expressly advised of that conflict on August 13, 2026 and has neither acknowledged the notice nor responded to the conflict concern.
A public HTML copy of that notice is available here:
https://www.thewolfandtheneuralnetwork.com/HTMLDocuments/2026-08-13_Notice_Of_Conflict_Of_Interest_Cpl_Joseph_Fraser_CRCC_2026-1781.html (https://tinyurl.com/4mtjtwhu)
The CRCC’s handling of Commissioner Michael Duheme and then-Commissioner Dennis Daley creates another serious problem. On March 16, 2026, I submitted a detailed complaint identifying both Commissioners as proposed subject members and setting out the allegations concerning them. The CRCC subsequently declined to add them, relying on the number of recipients copied on the correspondence and characterizing the material as “spam.” I was then advised that there was no mechanism through the CRCC to have those complaints added.
On July 24, 2026, the CRCC expressly directed me to provide any further details or clarification concerning 2026-1781 — including the addition or removal of subject members — to the Public Complaint Investigator. In the same letter, however, the CRCC characterized my “repeated lengthy emails” as disruptive and again threatened to restrict my communications. This occurred after the detailed reviews of March 27, April 7 and April 13, 2026, which were submitted only after approximately 300 days of unresolved complaints and inaction. The resulting length was a consequence of those failures, not their cause.
A copy of the CRCC’s July 24, 2026 transmission is available here:
https://thewolfandtheneuralnetwork.com/Media/Resources/CRCC/Transmission%20R2025-009888%20Scott%20Jewers_redacted.pdf (https://tinyurl.com/zp4v3x8v)
It is reasonable to ask whether the CRCC is now relying on its July 24, 2026 transmission and the number of email recipients to justify its refusal to respond to the August 13, 2026 conflict-of-interest disclosure. That position is not supported by the CRCC’s own restrictions. The conflict disclosure did not breach those restrictions and raised a new, specific and material concern regarding the impartiality of the Public Complaint Investigator assigned to 2026-1781 — a concern that directly affects not only the CRCC process, but also matters involving NSIRA, CSIS and the RCMP. That prior involvement should reasonably have been disclosed by Cpl. Joseph Fraser and the assigned “Decision Maker” before Fraser was permitted to investigate 2026-1781.
Following the CRCC’s own direction, on August 26, 2026, I again requested that Cpl. Joseph Fraser add Commissioner Michael Duheme, then-Commissioner Dennis Daley, and Cpl. Joseph Fraser himself to 2026-1781 as subject members, including Fraser because of his prior involvement in 2023-1031 and the resulting conflict-of-interest concern. Fraser has maintained that he does not consider himself to be in a conflict of interest. If that is genuinely his position, there should be no procedural difficulty in adding him as a subject member so that his own prior involvement and conduct can be independently examined. His refusal to recognize a conflict does not eliminate the underlying facts giving rise to that concern; if anything, it further demonstrates why independent review is necessary.
https://thewolfandtheneuralnetwork.com/HTMLDocuments/2026-08-26_Response_to_Cpl_Joseph_Fraser_Transfer_NSIRA_Referral_National_Security_and_Sexual_Assault_Provisions.html (https://tinyurl.com/946nrubj)
With respect to Commissioner Duheme and then-Commissioner Daley, however, the CRCC still owes an actual answer, not simply the phrase “too many recipients.” What is the number? At exactly how many email recipients does the CRCC consider otherwise documented allegations concerning sexual assault, national security, election interference or foreign interference to become “spam,” frivolous, or otherwise capable of being disregarded? And what statute, regulation or CRCC policy establishes that numerical threshold?
The long-term consequence of that determination is serious. If that reasoning is allowed to stand, it creates a precedent and a ready-made excuse for the RCMP, based on an arbitrary numerical threshold, that could be relied upon in other cases involving sexual assault, national security, election interference or foreign interference. It would also allow the CRCC to arbitrarily decide what number of recipients is “too many” when doing so benefits its own narrative, while punishing victims for taking steps to protect themselves.
This is particularly important because the individuals being excluded were not incidental names somewhere within a distribution list. Michael Duheme and Dennis Daley were specifically identified as proposed subject members, and the allegations concerning them were expressly detailed in the complaint materials. The number of people who subsequently received copies of that evidence does not explain why the underlying allegations were removed from the complaint process.
In parallel, after a detailed review of the CRCC’s handling of these matters was submitted on July 29, 2026, documenting what I allege was abusive and retaliatory treatment of a complainant who had detailed misconduct within the complaint process:
https://www.thewolfandtheneuralnetwork.com/Media/Resources/CRCC/2026-07-29_CRCC_Response_Regarding_Complaint_Handling_And_Escalation.docx (https://tinyurl.com/bde9rsy4)
On July 30, 2026, I then received an unsolicited written response from A/Commr. Dan Morrow, Commanding Officer of RCMP Nova Scotia.
Morrow stated that he was responding to correspondence I had submitted “through the Office of the Commissioner” and that my “package and accompanying materials have been reviewed.” He confirmed that the sexual-assault matter remained under investigation and stated that the concerns I had raised regarding RCMP members were being addressed through the CRCC process.
A copy of Morrow’s response is available here:
https://thewolfandtheneuralnetwork.com/Media/Resources/CRCC/Reply%20Letter.pdf (https://tinyurl.com/y5f96xv5)
What Morrow's response does not mention at all is equally important: CSIS case Attachment5566, national security, foreign interference, election interference, the rape calls, the killing of a dog, or possible extortion attempts involving $50,000. Morrow also provided no case number or direct contact information concerning the sexual-assault investigation, despite having been advised that the assigned officer, Sgt. Shelly Mews, had not contacted the complainant for more than 519 days and that there is video evidence concerning the deletion of voicemails I had left for her.
Meanwhile, Sgt. Curt Wallace contacted me from an unknown number and left no callback information, creating yet another communication loop in which the complainant could later be blamed for failing to make contact despite having been provided no practical means of returning the call.
That leaves a limited number of possibilities: the CRCC did not provide the CSIS case reference or national-security information to Morrow; the Minister’s office did not provide it; or it was provided and Morrow did not address it. That omission is significant because section 6(1) of the Security Offences Act provides that RCMP members who are peace officers have “the primary responsibility” to perform peace-officer duties in relation to offences referred to in section 2 of that Act. This was therefore not a matter that could simply be treated as solely the responsibility of CSIS.
https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/S-7/section-6.html
On August 13, 2026, when I detailed the conflict-of-interest concerns regarding Cpl. Joseph Fraser, A/Commr. Dan Morrow was included on the thread. Morrow’s automatic response confirmed that his RCMP account had received the correspondence and stated that he would return to the office on August 24, 2026.
https://thewolfandtheneuralnetwork.com/Media/Resources/Added_2026_08/2026-08-13-Dan-Morrow-H-Division-Receipt-of-Joseph-Fraser-Conflict-Email-Before-Transfer-Announcement.jpg (https://tinyurl.com/mr2rde6d)
On August 14, 2026, I then wrote directly to A/Commr. Morrow, his office, Commissioner Michael Duheme, Catherine Gordon and Jana Caines of the RCMP, NSIRA and others, specifically asking whether the information provided to RCMP Nova Scotia included CSIS case Attachment5566, the national-security concerns and the election-interference allegations.
An HTML copy of that email is publicly available at:
https://thewolfandtheneuralnetwork.com/HTMLDocuments/2026-08-14_Response_To_Assistant_Commissioner_Morrow_Investigation_And_National_Security_Questions.html (https://tinyurl.com/yjsztr7u)
I have received no response.
Up to that point, Cpl. Joseph Fraser had responded to every email I sent him within approximately 24 hours. However, after the August 13, 2026 conflict-of-interest disclosure, that pattern changed. On August 24, 2026 — coincidentally, the same date Morrow’s automatic response identified as his return to the office — Fraser responded and advised that he was transferring to another unit, claiming that my conflict concerns had therefore “worked themselves out.” The timing raises a fair question about whether the conflict disclosure and subsequent transfer were related.
Fraser's statement that the conflict of interest had "worked themselves out" does not address the underlying problem. Fraser had already selected the provisions, contacted subject officers and made investigative decisions while refusing to answer basic questions concerning the sexual-assault and national-security components. His transfer does not undo those actions or remove them from the record. It obscures them — and if another investigator is assigned and subsequently corrects the record, there is a serious risk that Fraser’s earlier decisions will simply be characterized as a difference of opinion rather than independently examined as part of the alleged obstruction documented throughout this record.
At this stage, the RCMP and CRCC have completely failed this process. The evidence supporting my allegation of intentional obstruction designed to conceal or avoid scrutiny of their own misconduct is staggering. Quite frankly, I believe the Minister of Public Safety should request an independent criminal investigation into whether any conduct disclosed through this record — particularly conduct involving the CRCC — amounts to obstruction or other criminal wrongdoing. I would also request a parliamentary inquiry into the entire process.
I am therefore asking the Minister of Public Safety, Gary Anandasangaree, to take the following actions:
- Reach out to Commissioner Michael Duheme and have the RCMP open a case regarding the national-security, election-interference and foreign-interference allegations. Have an RCMP officer from outside Nova Scotia assigned to the investigation, and have Commissioner Duheme himself contact me in writing, in a signed letter, confirming the RCMP case number.
- Reach out to CSIS and organize a meeting between myself and Director Daniel Rogers regarding Attachment5566. I am specifically requesting a meeting with Director Rogers and will not accept a substitute. CSIS has had more than a year to review and prepare regarding this matter.
- Reach out to NSIRA, have them open a case, and organize a meeting between myself and the Director of NSIRA.
- Have your office initiate a full inquiry into the actions of the CRCC.
In addition, I ask the CRCC and the Minister of Public Safety to answer the following directly:
- Was the national-security component ever referred to NSIRA? If so, when, by whom, under what file number, and where is the statutory notice to the complainant?
- Why did the CRCC state on April 8, 2026 that sexual assault, election interference and national security were being addressed under R2024-005807 if the Commission itself states that national-security matters are to be referred to NSIRA?
- Why was R2024-005807 subsequently merged into 2026-1781 and assigned to Cpl. Joseph Fraser despite his prior involvement in 2023-1031?
- Why has the CRCC not acknowledged or responded to the August 13, 2026 conflict-of-interest notice?
- Why were Commissioner Michael Duheme and Commissioner Dennis Daley excluded as subject members after being specifically identified in the complaint materials?
- What role did the number of email recipients play in that decision, and what is the exact number of recipients at which the CRCC considers allegations or supporting evidence to become frivolous, spam, or otherwise capable of being disregarded? Please identify the statutory or policy basis for that threshold.
- What information was provided to the Office of the Commissioner and A/Commr. Dan Morrow concerning these complaints?
- Did that information include CSIS case Attachment5566, the national-security concerns and the election-interference allegations?
- If it did, why are those issues absent from A/Commr. Morrow’s written response? If it did not, why were they omitted?
- Who determined what information concerning R2024-005807 and 2026-1781 would be transmitted to RCMP command?
These are not peripheral questions. They go directly to jurisdiction, statutory compliance, the integrity of the public-complaint process, and whether national-security information was properly routed, investigated and preserved.
They require direct answers.
Everything stated above can be independently verified through the HTML record of my correspondence with the CRCC:
https://thewolfandtheneuralnetwork.com/HTMLDocuments/All%20CRCC%20Follow%20ups.html (https://tinyurl.com/369htxj7)
This letter has been posted publicly to Facebook and X. An HTML copy of this letter is also available at:
https://thewolfandtheneuralnetwork.com/HTMLDocuments/2026-08-27_CRCC_Minister_Public_Safety_NSIRA_Referral_Failure_Conflict_And_Request_For_Independent_Investigation.html (https://tinyurl.com/3rrsu7zk)
Scott Jewers
902-220-9106